The current process of modernization of the Cuban socioeconomic model has fostered new private and cooperative property relations. However, in contrast to the apparent strategy of decentralization around other economic activities, the field of cultural production remains remarkably unchanged. Some of the most distinctive features of contemporary neoliberal capitalism, related to the centrality of culture to a globalized economic system, are increasingly visible in “la nueva Habana.” From the proliferation of private night clubs that have benefited from the booming tourist industry; to music festivals organized by creative teams of mixed foreign and national composition (e.g. Havana World Music, Musicabana); to the emergence of large cultural centers such as Fábrica de Arte Cubano (FAC) we can see plenty of experimental models of self-management without precedent in socialist Cuba. Yet, independent music production and performance has hardly been recognized legally, leaving music and musicians vulnerable to the ambiguities of the informal economy.
An Outdated Cultural Policy
There is a significant legal vacuum in today’s cultural sector. This affects many initiatives that have proved to be sustainable alternatives to what the state offers. Part of the official argument is that the current state-centric model has been successful. It has been able to cover its costs in hard currency with its own revenues. Thus, this argument goes, moving away from state relations of property would introduce unnecessary competition in the state sector. The fear of losing control over the creative process is understandable. The current system has provided highly subsidized cultural consumption. But, as is happening in other realms of the Cuban economy, this is a new context, open to new economic and regulatory possibilities.
While the state claims it needs consistency in its cultural policy, recent facts, under-reported by the state media, are clear symptoms of important structural transformations at the macro-management level of the industry. Two examples come to mind. Concerts organized by foreign entities are easily and quickly approved. Furthermore, the uncertain legal status of highly skilled Cuban specialists in the sector is making them available as cheap labor. Consider the famous 2016 Rolling Stones concert at the Ciudad Deportiva. It was of course tremendously popular; so much so that it displaced the Havana World Music festival, another major event scheduled for the same time. Another moment which signaled huge changes in the music world, was the agreement signed between Sony and EGREM in 2015. This agreement gives the multinational corporation access to the most significant catalogue of post-1960 Cuban music and authorization to distribute it and make a profit out of it for several years.
Experiments in Self-Management
I have been studying recent developments in Havana’s music industry for about four years, first for a Masters degree now for a PhD. I have centered my attention on the segment engaged with the production of live music performances because it is the most vibrant and underexplored territory. I am exploring different scenes, including hip hop and electronica, and the power politics involved in their struggle with state cultural institutions. Recent changes, that range from a more flexible migratory policy to the ongoing process of normalization of relations between the Cuban and North American governments, have moved the angle of my research a few degrees. My focus has shifted from the analysis of independent projects such as the Rotilla festival, to the exploration of the new contradictions arising from the “modernization” agenda of the state. I have particularly focused on the limitations resulting from vague regulation in the cultural sector.
Although I acknowledge the relevance of initiatives that are totally administered by state institutions, I concentrate on independent or hybrid musical productions that remain underexplored. By hybrid productions I mean collaborations between institutions such as the Cuban Institute of Music, and cultural promoters such as the informal cooperative La Rueda Producciones. While members of the creative teams managing great projects such as FAC or the Havana World Music festival are often affiliated with institutions, they function as autonomous or non-institutional agents. They operate these projects with their own aesthetic criteria, and with the level of specialization, transnational connections, entrepreneurial spirit, speed, and flexibility that this sector requires.
The state institutions’ work has demonstrated that a conventional socialist approach, with little incentive for the individual, cannot compete in quality and popularity with a more autonomous business model.
Alliances between the state and autonomous cultural producers are often productive and desirable, as many of my interviews suggest. But besides the likely existence of common goals, these alliances are also consequences of poor regulation, often advertised as “experimentation,” creating more problems than solutions. These collaborations take place because this is the only way to do it. There are no visible efforts by the state to modify—in ways that might be consistent with a strategy of selective legalization of non-state relations of property—the legal and financial infrastructures available to produce a large-scale event or run a cultural center. What exists are forced alliances where the producer, manager, or promoter has to continually test the boundaries of what the state has sanctioned (or left undefined) in matters of cultural production.
Besides this trend of hybrid state/non-state management of cultural projects, there is evidence of a more independent sub-segment formed by labels producing live music performances. Some examples are Guámpara Music (DJ Jigüe, urban music) and Analógica Label (DJoy de Cuba, electronic music). The other sub-segment that I consider in my investigation is formed around live music shows offered in many private clubs and bars of the city. Licenses do not exist for this kind of activity in the emergent private sector, so they operate as paladares. Recently, the licenses of Shangrilá and other private night clubs were suspended; another example of the vulnerabilities in the field of cultural production.
Creative economies: A Wolf at the Door?
The examples I have mentioned, together with other projects whose focus is not primarily on musical production (e.g. the designer brand Clandestina and the tattoo studio La Marca), are learning to operate as so-called creative economies. This is a recent mutation in the way that work and resources are organized to cope with the rules imposed by neoliberalism. In a creative economy, the goal is to capitalize (economically and socially) on culture by increasing an idea’s value by means of collective creative imagination. The distinctive characteristic of this approach has to do with the preeminence of the cultural product or service in the economy, requiring an environment where creativity can thrive. This requires a minimum level of censorship; easy and fast access to information from different sources; and a sound legal, financial and technological infrastructure. On all of these points Havana ranks very low.
However, habaneros are well known for their capacity for innovation. In spite of these and other adversities—such as the U.S. embargo—an increasing number of entrepreneurs are filling the gaps left by the state. It is becoming evident that is not desirable to have a paternalistic state in charge of every single detail in the complex processes of cultural production. The networks that these pioneering creative economies are forging could lead to new ways of understanding the value of culture in Cuba. I think this partially explains the conservative stance of the state when it comes to incorporating cultural production into its current economic agenda. Even in the worst moments of crisis, the leadership has maintained a traditional approach in terms of basing value on conventional resources such as capital, labor, and land, rather than on more novel imaginative qualities.
From a classic reading of socialism, creativity as a key economic resource may seem dangerous.
In other sectors, efforts are being made to explore new formulas while preserving the social achievements of the revolution. Perhaps with the best of the intentions, the Cuban state, by embracing the entry of foreign capital and small private and cooperative forms of property, has gotten deeper into a neoliberal path. This scenario resembles the twin modalities of neoliberal governmentality adopted by the Chinese government in similar circumstances, and that Dutch scholar Jeroen De Kloet labeled as “neoliberalism as exception” and “exceptions to neoliberalism.” Thus, I think is important to analyze the social and economic potential of creativity in the context of Havana’s vibrant live music scene. How can this be adapted to the modernization of Cuba’s socioeconomic model without major trauma?
Conclusions
In the cultural sector, the Cuban government has kept an ineffective policy that doesn’t address properly the current structure and characteristics of the arts industries. There is an urgent need for an updated regulatory framework that allows non-institutional producers, promoters, and managers to create more freely; enjoy legal protection; contribute culturally and financially to society; and to make a living from their work as cuentapropistas or cooperatives. The state should be helping to create conditions so that emerging creative economies can thrive. This would involve a series of reforms in the fields of legislation, communications, and finances—areas where the state remains conservative.
The openings since 17-D-2014 are being revoked and officially criticized. The returning ministry of culture Abel Prieto has made clear that the Cuban government is concerned about Obama’s interest in empowering civil society and private small businesses on the island. Thus, instead of taking advantage of Cuba’s praised cultural capital, it seems like culture once again is being summoned to play the role of protector of the Cuban revolution from the new threats posed by the United States. Although I agree with Louis A. Pérez, Jr., in his recent article on NACLA, that Obama’s actions are a change of means, not ends, this should not be used as a justification to suffocate the creative force of cultural entrepreneurs. In a very short period, their projects have created positive change in their communities, as they have introduced economic practices that resonate with the greater goal of finding a sustainable way out to the crisis.
Part of the state response has been a new resolution (Resolution 22, published in the Gaceta Oficial, last August) to regulate the financing of non-profit cultural projects. According to the new rules, cultural producers will have to obtain the approval of the Ministry of Culture and deal with its institutions as mandatory intermediaries in order to use funds coming from any source. This means more bureaucracy and unnecessary control, and puts more limits to an already difficult creative environment. The moment of “enlightenment,” in which Cuban cultural authorities realize that these emergent models of self-management are their natural allies, might be more distant than we thought. Within the segment of the music sector that I study, I see that a collective approach remains dominant. This world is composed of people who care about positive social impact. It seems like a common goal still exists, struggling against justified but destructive fears.
COVER IMAGE: Show at La Fabrica de Arte. By Maria Antonia Cabrera Arús (2014).